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 Rewriting the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms: Four 
Suggestions Designed to Promote a 
Fairer Trial and Evidentiary Process 
Peter Sankoff 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although only a quarter of a century old — still youthful in 
jurisprudential terms — the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 
has cemented its place as a vital force in Canadian criminal justice. 
Charter arguments are raised across the country on a daily basis, and for 
the most part these arguments have helped to secure a much fairer trial 
and evidentiary process for criminal defendants than was available in 1982.2 
For all of the benefits it provides, the Charter can hardly be considered a 
flawless document, however. The drafting process that produced the 
Constitution Act, 19823 involved considerable consultation and “give-
and-take” between government officials from every jurisdiction,4 and 
although the final version has stood up reasonably well, 25 years of 
jurisprudence has revealed a few cracks in the foundation. If it were 
possible to draft a new Charter with the advantage of hindsight, one 
imagines that different language might be used to avoid difficulties that 
have confounded courts and critics alike. Notwithstanding the impediments 
                                                                                                            

 Faculty of Law, University of Auckland (New Zealand). The author wishes to thank 
Ursula Hendel for her helpful comments on this article.  
1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2
 For a general debate on the merits of what the Charter has achieved in this sphere, see  
C. L’Heureux-Dubé, “The Charter of Rights and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Canada 
— Where Have We Been and Where Shall We Go?” (2006) 3 Ohio State J. of Crim. L. 473; and  
P. Sankoff, “Generally Speaking, Canada Is Going in the Right Direction: A Response to the 
Honourable Claire L’Heureux-Dubé” (2006) 3 Ohio State J. of Crim. L. 491.  
3 Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
4
 See J. Weiler & R. Elliott, eds., Litigating the Values of A Nation: The Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1986), at “Part I — The Making of the Charter”.  
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that make such changes unlikely to ever occur,5 I thought it would be 
useful to take advantage of this important anniversary and consider what 
the results of such a revised process might produce, something that will 
allow me simultaneously to reflect upon the successes and failures of 
the Constitution’s first 25 years. 
Owing to the nature and restricted length of this work, I have confined 
my examination to issues concerning the law of evidence and the trial 
process and chosen what I see to be four of the most significant aspects 
of the Charter requiring a fresh approach. It is in these areas that I suggest 
rewriting a “new” version of the Charter. 
II. SECTION 24(2) — TWO ALTERATIONS FOR A  
FAIRER REMEDIAL CLAUSE 
It is impossible to write about successes and failures without spending 
time focusing upon the part of the Charter that has most significantly 
affected the trial process: section 24(2), the exclusionary clause. Prior to 
the Charter’s enactment, the law of evidence focused almost exclusively 
on the probative value and prejudicial effect of the proof tendered by the 
prosecution. No matter how a piece of evidence might have been obtained, 
the sole concern for the trial judge in resolving admissibility was its  
potential utility in court.6 Section 24(2) altered this situation dramatically. 
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association and other organizations fought 
diligently to have an exclusionary clause introduced into the Charter,7 
and it is easy to see why. In addition to being a “boon” for defence 
lawyers,8 the clause gives teeth to the Charter’s substantive rights, and 
provides state actors with a significant incentive to comply with Charter 
rulings. 
However, the effectiveness of section 24(2) remains one of the  
most hotly disputed aspects of Canada’s ongoing constitutional debate.9 
Regardless of one’s views on the importance of respecting an individual’s 
                                                                                                            
5
 The difficulties of securing amendments to the Constitution are well known. See P. Hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997- ), at 4-40 to 4-43.  
6
 R. v. Wray (1970), [1971] S.C.R. 272, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.).  
7
 D. Gibson, The Law of the Charter: General Principles (Toronto: Carswell, 1986), at 222-23.  
8
 See A. Gold & M. Fuerst, “The Stuff that Dreams are Made Of! — Criminal Law and 
the Charter of Rights” (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 13.  
9
 See, for example, the contrasting views of S. Penney, “Taking Deterrence Seriously: 
Excluding Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence under Section 24(2) of the Charter” (2004) 49 McGill 
L.J. 105; and R. Fraser & J. Addison, “What’s Truth Got to Do With It? The Supreme Court of 
Canada and Section 24(2)” (2004) 29 Queens L.J. 823.  
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rights, excluding probative evidence obtained via unconstitutional methods 
is an extremely controversial practice. The cost of occasionally letting a 
guilty defendant go free is a high one and clashes with the strong trend 
in the law of evidence towards making all relevant proof available to the 
trier of fact.10 It is hardly surprising that the Supreme Court has divided 
on numerous occasions regarding the optimal manner of applying this 
powerful clause.11 
Although reconciling the conflicting crime control and due process 
principles that are at the heart of the section 24(2) exercise will never be 
easy, the Supreme Court should be generally commended for having 
interpreted this clause in a way that balances respect for the Charter and 
law enforcement interests in determining whether exclusion is warranted 
in a particular case.12 Nonetheless, in seeking to develop the best possible 
balance, the Supreme Court has made two critical decisions that have 
hindered the process. To rectify these deficiencies, I will suggest two 
amendments to the existing wording of section 24(2). 
1. Widening the Current Standing Rules 
The first alteration is as follows: 
 24(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes 
that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any 
rights or freedoms of any person guaranteed by this Charter, ... 
With 25 years of Charter decisions to choose from, it is not easy to 
narrow down a manageable list of favourites. Coming up with my personal 
shortlist of disliked judgments is considerably easier, however, as on 
this register two section 24(2) cases leap right to the head of the queue: 
R. v. Edwards13 and R. v. Belnavis.14 Neither of these Supreme Court 
decisions is particularly complicated as both stand for the same proposition: 
                                                                                                            
10
 R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at 714 (S.C.C.); Trammel v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 40, at 50-51 (1980). 
11
 See, for example, R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.);  
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.); R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, 
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.).  
12
 Although the Supreme Court has received tremendous criticism from all sides for its s. 24(2) 
jurisprudence, it should be acknowledged that the interpretation could have been much more 
narrow than what currently exists, and access to this remedy might have been cut off from the start 
had the dissenting judgments in R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.) 
or R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) become the law.  
13
 [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.). 
14
 [1997] S.C.J. No. 341, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.). 
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that access to a section 24(2) remedy is personal.15 To put it another way, 
a defendant is forbidden from bringing a challenge to exclude evidence 
obtained pursuant to a Charter violation unless it was his or her rights 
that were actually breached by the state.16 
Edwards17 and Belnavis18 have been the subject of considerable 
academic criticism,19 and much of the disapproval has targeted the dearth 
of principled reasoning for the absolute prohibition against third party 
claims. In both cases, a majority of the Supreme Court ignored passionate 
and persuasive dissenting opinions from La Forest J. and relied instead 
upon American jurisprudence made in a very different context,20 combined 
with a narrow interpretation of section 24(1) that permits a court to grant 
a remedy to “any person whose rights have been aggrieved”.21 The 
rationale for the stringent approach — such that there is one — seems to 
be to resist providing defendants with the “windfall” of a remedy for a 
constitutional violation they did not personally suffer, an approach that 
                                                                                                            
15
 It should be noted that this point is often characterized as an issue relating to the accused’s 
substantive right in that, to take one example, he or she cannot bring a s. 8 Charter challenge 
because that right is personal. But the need to establish a “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
sufficient to trigger such a Charter challenge only arises because of the courts’ refusal to permit 
challenges on behalf of others owing to the current interpretation of s. 24(1). See the discussion on 
this point in R. v. Sandhu, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1279, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 236 (B.C.C.A.).  
16
 Given the results this approach produces, it is not surprising that some judges have 
attempted to avoid it by concluding that the illegal activity or the admission of tainted evidence by 
the Crown constitutes an abuse of process under s. 7 of the Charter, or by simply refusing to follow 
R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.) altogether: R. v. Trang, [2001] 
A.J. No. 1498, 300 A.R. 105 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Tran, [2004] A.J. No. 1000, [2004] 3 W.W.R. 752 
(Alta. Prov. Ct.). For further detail on how such an argument might proceed, see U. Hendel &  
P. Sankoff, “R. v. Edwards: When Two Wrongs Might Just Make a Right” (1996) 45 C.R. (3d) 330. 
This is not a real solution to the standing problem, however. There is no guarantee this “back door” 
method of challenging violations of third party rights will succeed and it is rejected as often as it is 
adopted: R. v. Paolitto, [1994] O.J. No. 1220, 91 C.C.C. (3d) 75 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Campbell, 
[2002] A.J. No. 734, 318 A.R. 302 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Adam, [2006] B.C.J. No. 531 (B.C.S.C.). 
Moreover, the approach invites conflicting jurisprudence and a highly technical approach to the 
Charter. As L’Heureux-Dubé J. noted in R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411,  
at 462 (S.C.C.), “we should not invite schizophrenia into the law.” Abuse of process claims are no 
substitute for a properly considered balancing under s. 24(2). 
17
 R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.). 
18
 R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.). 
19
 D. Schwartz, “Edwards and Belnavis: Front and Rear Door Exceptions to the Right to be 
Secure from Unreasonable Search and Seizure” (1997) 10 C.R. (5th) 100; G. Luther, “Of Excision, 
Amplification and Standing: Making Sense of the Law of Evidence in the Context of Challenges to 
Warranted Searches” (2006) 11 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 1.  
20
 As La Forest J. pointed out in R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, 
at 157 (S.C.C.), the strict approach to standing in the U.S. “seems largely motivated by the social 
costs attendant upon the application of the strict exclusionary rule in the United States”. 
21
 Section 24(2), however, has no such wording and it would have been possible for the 
Court to read this provision in a different manner.  
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might make sense if the purpose of the Charter’s remedial clause was to 
vindicate or compensate individual claims. This is not what section 24(2) 
is designed to do, however.22 The wording of the clause requires an 
expansive assessment of circumstances and whether admission of the 
disputed evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, 
a task that has always focused upon broader public objectives beyond 
the individual accused, concentrating on the need to dissociate the judiciary 
from unconstitutional conduct,23 or to deter state actors from contravening 
the Charter over the long term.24 
Whether or not a particular defendant “profits” is largely irrelevant 
to the exercise, as the focus is primarily on the institutional benefits of 
exclusion. With that in mind, what reason is there for barring third party 
claims as a matter of course? That answer is hard to come by, but one 
thing is certain on the other side of the ledger: the direct consequence of 
this approach is to permit and arguably even encourage25 state agents to 
violate the Charter rights of third parties, secure in the knowledge that the 
real target of their searches or inquiries will be unable to object at any stage. 
A study of the post-Edwards26 and Belnavis27 jurisprudence confirms 
this trend. Evidence will not be excluded where the police detain and 
search one individual unconstitutionally, and then use the information to 
pursue another.28 Illegal wiretapping of conspiratorial conversations is 
also permissible, as the Charter only mandates exclusion of evidence 
obtained from the speakers, and the information can still be used against 
members of the conspiracy whose phones were not tapped and who 
were not part of the conversation.29 Where the police are not interested 
in a detained person as a suspect, they can deliberately refrain from 
providing access to counsel and question at length, subsequently relying 
upon any answers provided to investigate a secondary target.30 Regardless 
                                                                                                            
22
 S. Penney, “Taking Deterrence Seriously: Excluding Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence 
under Section 24(2) of the Charter” (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 105, at 111-13. 
23
 R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 280-81 (S.C.C.). 
24
 R. v. Burlingham, [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206, at 242 (S.C.C.).  
25
 Where the police are not targeting a particular individual, the standing jurisprudence 
provides them with an incentive to breach that person’s rights in the hope that these persons might 
have incriminating evidence to offer against another.  
26
 R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.). 
27
 R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.). 
28
 R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.). 
29
 R. v. Cheung, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2282, 119 C.C.C. (3d) 507 (B.C.C.A.).  
30
 R. v. Hyatt, [2003] B.C.J. No. 63, 171 C.C.C. (3d) 409 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Scott, [2004] 
N.S.J. No. 451, 191 C.C.C. (3d) 183 (N.S.C.A.). Derivative evidence obtained from such questioning 
can also be used against another target.  
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of how intentional, serious or abusive an unconstitutional action might 
be in the abstract, there is little risk of an investigation being compromised 
by resort to section 24(2) so long as there is another target against whom 
the fruits of these illegal activities can be utilized. It is not at all uncommon 
to see cases involving jointly tried accused where evidence is excluded 
against one defendant and admitted against another.31 
This approach is both disappointing and unnecessary, especially 
considering that section 24(2) has a built-in mechanism allowing judges 
to consider the remoteness of a defendant’s claim in assessing whether to 
exclude the evidence. In direct contrast to the American jurisprudence upon 
which Edwards32 and Belnavis33 rely, exclusion does not automatically 
follow the finding of a Charter violation. The courts could easily address 
standing issues in the same way as they currently deal with the causal 
link between the violation and the discovery of evidence: as one factor 
to consider in the overall balancing process.34 
This is exactly the approach that has been taken in New Zealand under 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.35 Until 2002, New Zealand 
courts applied the strict American approach to exclusion, whereby any 
evidence discovered pursuant to a rights violation had to be excluded 
from the proceeding.36 Courts naturally latched on to the U.S. approach 
to standing as well, reasoning that claims advanced by third parties were 
less directly connected to the Bill of Rights violation, and arguably less 
serious as a result. Faced with the harsh consequence of exclusion every 
time any person’s right was violated during the course of obtaining 
evidence, the courts imposed a harsh standing requirement instead.37 In 
2002 however, the New Zealand Court of Appeal revisited the rule of 
automatic exclusion and replaced it with a more flexible test crafted along 
                                                                                                            
31
 For example, R. v. Le, [2005] B.C.J. No. 2898 (B.C. Prov. Ct.). See also R. v. Belnavis, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 81, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.), per Iacobucci J.  
32
 R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.). 
33
 R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.). 
34
 R. v. Strachan, [1988] S.C.J. No. 94, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.); R. v. Goldhart, 
[1996] S.C.J. No. 76, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 463 (S.C.C.), adopting an expansive approach to the nexus 
between breach and obtaining of evidence, specifically rejecting the American approach, which 
requires a strong causal link. See also K. Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, looseleaf 
(Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 1994- ), at 10-32 to 10-33. 
35 No. 109 of 1990. 
36
 R. v. Butcher, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (N.Z.C.A.); R. v. Goodwin, [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R. 153 
(N.Z.C.A.).  
37
 R. v. Bruhns (1994), 11 C.R.N.Z. 656 (N.Z.C.A.); R. v. Holford, [2001] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 
(N.Z.C.A.). For a compelling critique of this approach in the New Zealand context, see P. Rishworth,  
et al., The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 788-99. 
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the lines of section 24(2) of the Charter.38 In a subsequent decision, the 
Court of Appeal reconsidered the standing requirement in light of the new 
test and concluded that continuing to exclude third party claims without 
considering their merits was neither desirable nor necessary. The Court 
of Appeal specifically examined and refused to follow the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s reasoning in Edwards,39 holding quite succinctly that: 
Having “standing” as an “all or nothing” concept risks encouraging 
unlawful behaviour on the part of the police . . . . In a civilised society, 
it is vital that those entrusted with the enforcement of the law be required 
to follow it themselves.40 
This approach is preferable to that which currently prevails in Canada. 
Section 24(2) is a balancing exercise permitting consideration of a 
multitude of factors and there is no principled reason to make standing a 
threshold concern. Doing so significantly diminishes the Charter’s power 
as a deterrent by sanctioning unconstitutional behaviour undertaken against 
anyone who is not a target of the police investigation.41 Amending section 
24(2) in such a way so as to permit the courts to grant standing to anyone 
facing conviction by unconstitutionally obtained evidence would help 
achieve one of the exclusionary clause’s main objectives: ensuring that state 
actors obey the supreme law of the land and making such obeisance a 
primary characteristic of their investigative work. 
2. A Better Balance 
The second alteration is as follows: 
 24(2)… the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, 
having regard to all the circumstances, the seriousness of the violation 
warrants excluding the evidence. 
Although many aspects of the section 24(2) test of exclusion have 
come under scrutiny over the past 25 years, no part of the exercise has 
been a source of greater controversy than the treatment of conscripted 
                                                                                                            
38
 R. v. Shaheed, [2002] 2 N.Z.L.R. 377 (N.Z.C.A.). For an overview of this decision and 
its ramifications, see S. Optican & P. Sankoff, “The New Exclusionary Rule: A Preliminary 
Assessment of R. v. Shaheed”, [2003] N.Z.L. Rev. 1.  
39
 R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.). 
40
 R. v. Williams, [2007] NZCA 52, at para. 66 (N.Z.C.A.).  
41
 As La Forest J. pointed out in R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, 
at 153 (S.C.C.), this would actually “accord greater protection to the right of privacy to the accused or 
other wrongdoer than to a person against whom there may be no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing”.  
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evidence. In Collins,42 Lamer J. famously decreed that the impact upon 
the fairness of the trial would be a pre-eminent concern in deciding 
whether to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence pursuant to 
section 24(2). More importantly, he also concluded that the admission of 
“conscriptive” evidence — as opposed to other forms of proof — had 
the potential to render the trial unfair. It was a surprising conclusion that 
has played a determinative role in focusing the direction of section 24(2) 
jurisprudence, and since Collins, the fair trial criterion has only become 
more powerful. While Collins suggested that the fairness of the trial was 
merely one criterion — albeit a highly persuasive one — to consider in 
the overall calculus, subsequent authority transformed it into a distinct 
exclusionary rule,43 a result that was somewhat inevitable from the start, 
as Lamer J.’s use of the term “fair trial” had the effect of ratcheting up 
the stakes in the exclusionary analysis. In Stillman,44 for example, Cory 
J. noted the importance of excluding evidence of this nature: 
 A consideration of trial fairness is of fundamental importance . . . 
A fair trial for those accused of a criminal offence is a cornerstone of 
our Canadian democratic society. A conviction resulting from an unfair 
trial is contrary to our concept of justice. To uphold such a conviction 
would be unthinkable. It would indeed be a travesty of justice.45 
It is difficult to argue with such convincing rhetoric. One would be 
hard pressed to find a Canadian — even among vocal critics of the Charter 
— who would disagree with the notion that every person is entitled to a 
fair trial. A trial that is not fair simply cannot be countenanced. 
The problem, of course, is that it is by no means clear that conscripted 
evidence actually renders a trial unfair in accordance with the common 
understanding of this term,46 and since this reasoning was first adopted 
in Collins,47 a relentless barrage of criticism has contested the conceptual 
                                                                                                            
42
 R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). 
43
 R. v. Elshaw, [1991] S.C.J. No. 68, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 24 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] 
S.C.J. No. 100, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615 (S.C.C.).  
44
 R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.). 
45
 R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, at 651 (S.C.C.). 
46
 As Professor D. Paciocco notes in “Stillman, Disproportion and the Fair Trial Dichotomy” 
(1997) 2 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 163, at 167, “the logic leading to this conclusion is impressive. Indeed, 
it is irrefutable. If the admission of evidence will render a trial unfair, of course it must be excluded. 
What is not so impervious to rational criticism, however, is the more basic notion that the admission of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence can render a trial unfair.” 
47
 R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). 
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accuracy of this approach.48 Immediately after the release of Collins, 
Professor R.J. Delisle wrote a scathing critique of the Supreme Court’s 
discussion of what could threaten a “fair trial”: 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand why the fairness of a trial 
would or would not be affected by the admission of evidence obtained 
as the result of a Charter violation depending on the type of evidence 
obtained during the investigation. The knowledge of the accused’s 
involvement in the offence existed prior to the Charter violation but 
was produced for our examination by his self-incriminatory statement 
following the Charter violation; the real evidence existed prior to the 
violation but was produced for our examination only by its discovery 
through the unconstitutional search … The majority seek to make  
a distinction on the basis that the fundamental right against self-
incrimination is paramount … Both [the right against self-incrimination 
and the right against unreasonable search and seizure] are rooted in the 
concept of privacy. The majority does not explain why one right is to 
be regarded more highly than the other.49 
Indeed, despite adopting the fair trial criterion as the cornerstone of its 
jurisprudential approach to section 24(2), the Supreme Court has never 
gone to any lengths to explain what is so foul about conscripted evidence 
that its presence almost invariably renders a trial unfair. It is true that on 
many occasions reference has been made to self-incriminatory evidence, 
and the historic protection of the right to remain silent, but it is unclear 
what, if anything, turns on this. 
In fact, what seems to have influenced Lamer J. in Collins50 was the 
then recent decision of R. v. Sang,51 where a deeply divided House of 
Lords drew a distinction between illegally obtained evidence and evidence 
procured in violation of a person’s right to remain silent, holding that 
only the latter sort had an impact on the fairness of a defendant’s trial. 
This judgment, of course, was made in a conservative, common law 
environment and in the absence of any constitutional document. Its effect, 
                                                                                                            
48
 See, for example: D. Paciocco, “The Judicial Repeal of S. 24(2) and the Development of 
the Canadian Exclusionary Rule” (1990) 32 Crim. L.Q. 326; C. Brewer, “Stillman and Section 24(2): 
Much To-Do About Nothing” (1997) 2 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 239; R. Mahoney, “Problems with the 
Current Approach to s. 24(2) of the Charter: An Inevitable Discovery” (1999) 42 Crim. L.Q. 443;  
J. Pottow, “Constitutional Remedies in the Criminal Context: A Unified Approach to Section 24  
(Part II)” (2000) 44 Crim. L.Q. 34, at 46-58; S. Penney, “Taking Deterrence Seriously: Excluding 
Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence under Section 24(2) of the Charter” (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 105. 
49
 R.J. Delisle, “Collins: An Unjustified Distinction” (1987) 56 C.R. (3d) 216, at 217-18. 
50
 R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). 
51
 [1980] A.C. 402 (H.L.).  
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as Professor Delisle pointed out, was to create a hierarchy of rights — 
something the Supreme Court has strived to avoid on other occasions.52 
Distilled down to its central essence, the fair trial analysis rests on the 
notion that obtaining evidence from an accused prior to trial is somehow 
similar to compelling the accused to testify at trial, a proposition that does 
not really withstand serious scrutiny. Suspects are regularly persuaded 
to confess their crimes and provide bodily substances with the blessing 
of the courts and the only problem in section 24(2) cases lies in the 
manner by which this is done. As Professor Penney has noted, “[t]he 
Collins distinction is unworkable because it fails to recognize that it is 
the effect of the evidence, not its inherent ‘nature’, which implicates the 
fairness interests of the accused.”53 
If the fair trial designation turns on nothing more than the manner in 
which the proof was gathered, it is unclear why evidence such as statements 
and bodily substances deserve any special treatment. The protection 
afforded to “evidence of the body” is particularly unusual. As the Stillman54 
analysis makes clear, conscriptive evidence includes substances obtained 
from an accused’s person. Where, for example, the police unconstitutionally 
pluck a hair from the accused’s head, admission of this evidence renders 
the trial unfair, for the accused has been “compelled” to provide a bodily 
sample. If the same hair is unconstitutionally seized from the accused’s 
pillow, however, the trial is not rendered unfair.55 
The treatment of breath samples leads to equally peculiar results. 
The Supreme Court has held that where a Charter violation occurs prior 
to the taking of a breath sample, the sample will generally be deemed to 
have been conscripted. Essentially, the reasoning is that the accused’s 
participation in breathing into a machine renders the sample unfair. 56 
The same result would not occur, however, if science were able to provide 
a machine that measured the air emanating naturally out of the accused’s 
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mouth, simply because breathing is involuntary. Such a sample would in 
no way be “compelled” and would not affect trial fairness.57 These types 
of bizarre results confirm Professor Paciocco’s suspicion that the more 
one examines the fair trial designation, the more one is left with the 
conclusion that “there is no clear or compelling theoretical basis for [it]. 
Without a theoretical basis, the truism that we have to exclude evidence 
where its admission would undermine the fairness of the trial is empty, 
pointless and irrelevant.”58 
Even more damaging than the absence of a clear theoretical basis for 
exclusion is the possibility that the existing approach to section 24(2) 
has helped to perpetuate a negative view of the exclusionary rule as a 
whole. Over the past 20 years, conscriptive evidence has been routinely 
excluded from trials of all types. Without any consideration of the gravity 
of the breach, or the effects of exclusion, this sort of evidence has regularly 
been banished. In light of these results, it is no wonder that critics of the 
Charter point to section 24(2) as having effected an unbalanced approach 
in favour of accused persons, given that even technical violations of the 
right to counsel lead to exclusion of valuable and probative evidence on 
the altar of speculative concerns about “fairness”. 
It is also possible, though admittedly much more speculative, to 
contend that the jurisprudence has had another troublesome effect: the 
promotion of an extremely high standard for exclusion of evidence that 
is said not to impact upon trial fairness. In other words, in order to effect 
some sort of realistic compromise between evidence that is admitted 
against that which is excluded, the courts have set an unusually high 
threshold for non-conscriptive evidence, effectively to offset the regular 
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exclusion of conscriptive evidence. As a result, violations of the right to 
be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, which generally tend 
to involve non-conscriptive evidence, have traditionally been much less 
likely to be “protected” by the exclusionary rule. 
The time has come to abandon the distinction between conscriptive 
and non-conscriptive evidence.59 What should replace the dichotomy 
remains to be seen, but the most compelling approach would be to focus 
exclusively on the seriousness of the violation, and the objective of 
preventing future Charter breaches. In a detailed recent essay, Professor 
Penney set out a cogent argument for deterrence being the only rational 
justification for excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence.60 This 
proposal would focus solely upon the nature of the breach in question, 
and whether it was the product of an action that either intentionally or 
negligently contravened the defendant’s Charter rights. Such an approach 
would promote adherence to the Charter over the long term while 
maintaining police flexibility in situations of urgency or uncertain legal 
status.61 At the very least, it would operate on the basis of a clear and 
defensible rationale, rendering the exclusionary process a great deal more 
fair, predictable and acceptable. 
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where the law is unclear, or where the situation prevents them from acting in accordance with it. 
Once the law is clarified by a particular judgment, the police are “put on notice”, and must comply 
in future instances. 
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III. SECTION 11(f) — QUESTIONING THE SECTION’S  
PROTECTION OF THE JURY TRIAL 
The right to trial by jury is one of defining features of the English 
common law trial, protected by section 11(f) of the Charter, which 
guarantees the right in any case where the offence for which the defendant 
is being tried is subject to a maximum penalty of five years or greater. 
Notwithstanding its well-entrenched status in Canadian law, I believe 
that the right to trial by jury as expressed in section 11(f) is ill crafted. 
As it currently exists, the right is under-inclusive in failing to protect the 
accused’s right to choose a trial by jury in all cases. On a different and 
more provocative note, I believe there is also a reasonable case to be made 
for abolishing this Charter clause altogether. 
1. Fine-tuning the Right to Trial by Jury 
 11. Any person charged with an offence has the right… (f) except 
in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military 
tribunal, to the choice of a trial before judge alone or by jury where 
the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years 
or a more severe punishment. 
In its current form, section 11(f) effectively operates as a shield, 
prohibiting the government from abolishing trial by jury in cases of a 
serious nature. In the vast majority of cases, the combined effect of 
section 11(f) and the Criminal Code’s62 many procedural provisions on 
the subject is to guarantee the defendant a choice between a trial by jury 
and a trial by judge alone. Although a trial by jury is technically the 
default procedure for indictable offences,63 sections 536 and 558 give the 
defendant the right to elect a trial by judge alone in these cases. The ability 
to elect is qualified in three specific situations, however. Where the 
defendant is charged with a section 469 offence — which in modern times 
almost invariably means a murder count of some sort — and in any case 
where the Crown prefers a direct indictment, the defendant must have a 
trial by jury unless the prosecution consents to a trial by judge alone.64 
Additionally, the Attorney General retains the discretion to compel a trial 
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 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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 Section 471 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.  
64
 Section 473 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (in relation to s. 469 offences); 
s. 565(2) (in relation to direct indictments).  
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by jury in any proceeding where the defendant is charged with a crime 
punishable by a period of more than five years in prison.65 
The effect of these provisions is that the defendant’s ability to 
choose whether to proceed before a jury or by judge alone is limited in 
most instances by the Crown’s readiness to let such an election stand or 
proceed and, as it is currently constructed, section 11(f) provides no 
assistance. In R. v. Turpin,66 the Supreme Court concluded that the Charter 
provided no right to a non-jury trial. For a unanimous court, Wilson J. 
held that: 
There is a constitutional right to a jury trial and there may be a “right”, 
using that term loosely, in an accused to waive the right to a jury trial. 
An accused may repudiate his or her s. 11(f) right but such repudiation 
does not, in my view, transform the constitutional right to a jury trial 
into a constitutional right to a non-jury trial so as to overcome the 
mandatory jury trial provisions of the Criminal Code.67 
As a consequence, section 11(f) does not guarantee a defendant the 
right to choose which mode of trial he or she prefers, but simply ensures 
that a right to trial by jury is available in serious cases.68 
The reason for leaving the ultimate choice of trial forum with the 
Crown in the vast majority of cases is nothing more than a historical 
preference for jury trials combined with the belief that the public interest 
tends to be best served by this mode of proceeding in serious crimes. Jury 
trials are said to be “for the benefit of the community as a whole as well as 
for the benefit of the particular accused”.69 A jury verdict is regarded as 
providing a particular legitimacy that is not available from a judge sitting 
alone.70 
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Although this reasoning has prevailed for centuries and tends to be 
followed in other common law jurisdictions,71 it is hardly irrefutable. 
Leaving aside historical preference, the view that a jury trial is somehow 
better for the community than a trial by judge alone amounts to little 
more than assertion. There is little in the way of hard data to support it, 
and the general trend away from jury trials on a systemic level renders it 
increasingly questionable in the modern era. Although juries were once 
the norm where serious criminal offending was being resolved, this is no 
longer the case.72 Trial by judge alone is so common today that it is difficult 
to accept on faith that any type of charge requires a jury verdict to be 
legitimate. Judges deal with serious charges on a regular basis — even 
occasionally deciding murder cases — and there would seem to be little, 
if any, outcry. 
More importantly, arguments against imposing jury trials are mounting. 
To begin with, it is accepted by almost everyone involved in the justice 
process that the choice of judge or jury as fact-finder is a significant one 
that can make a difference to the ultimate outcome. It follows that the 
tactical decision of which forum to choose is of considerable import, 
and not one that is made lightly. Matters to be considered include the 
nature of the case, the evidence to be presented, the complexity of the 
issues, the “charisma” of the defendant, his or her criminal record and a 
multitude of other factors.73 As much as we might like to imagine that 
the particular forum has no impact on the likelihood of a conviction, our 
long experience with juries makes this position difficult to maintain, and 
even the jurisprudence recognizes that there are variances between what 
is permissible or risky in a jury trial and one before a judge alone.74 With 
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364 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
all that in mind, does the abstract benefit gained by providing the 
prosecution with the ability to ensure a jury trial in the “public interest” 
outweigh the potential prejudice suffered by the accused? 
The case for a broader section 11(f) right is also warranted by worries 
about increasing public access to information about criminal offending 
prior to trial. The release of inadmissible information to the public is likely 
to be a problem that will only get worse,75 with increasing access to online 
information and the almost rabid interest in crime stories from traditional 
media outlets combining to make the disinterested observer a vanishing 
breed. Once again, this interest in pre-trial information is often highest 
in the very crimes where the defendant is compelled to have a jury trial. 
In these cases, the defendant is left to fight for an impartial decision-maker 
through a variety of measures, including a change of venue, better 
challenge for cause and strict publication bans, but is precluded from 
choosing the strongest possible method of avoiding a prejudiced jury: 
skipping one altogether. 
Perhaps the most serious challenge to the Code exceptions is that 
they are not even that consistent with the “legitimacy” rationale under 
which they were originally enacted, in that jury trials are not actually 
mandatory. Instead, the exceptions render the defence election to proceed 
by judge alone subject to prosecutorial consent.76 While the Crown 
obviously will consider the public’s interest in having a jury trial, it is 
difficult to imagine some thought not being given to the strategic concerns 
mentioned above,77 which places the prosecution at a distinct tactical 
advantage before the trial even begins. The ironic result is that accused 
persons charged with the most serious offences under Canadian law are 
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actually in the weakest position regarding their right to choose the forum 
under which they will be tried. 
It is unusual and somewhat anachronistic that when the stakes are 
highest, we prohibit the defendant from deciding upon how he or she 
would like to be tried, and give this power to the defendant’s primary 
adversary instead. By all means, a defendant who wishes to have a jury 
trial in a murder case should have the benefit of one, but our system of 
criminal justice would be better served by rendering our system of election 
consistent in all cases, and a change to section 11(f) transforming it into 
a right to elect a trial by judge or jury would accomplish this important 
objective. 
2. A More Extreme Suggestion: Abolishing Section 11(f) Altogether 
There is of course one radical alternative to making section 11(f) 
more expansive, and that is to abolish section 11(f) altogether. Before 
going any further, I wish to make it clear that I am not suggesting that 
the jury system be abolished or that juries themselves are somehow evil 
or incompetent. I am not even convinced that abolishing section 11(f) is 
a sound course of action, as doing so requires the very constitutional 
reform I suggest below is at the heart of the problem with the clause, 
rendering my argument somewhat circular in nature.78 Notwithstanding 
these reservations, I believe this point is worthy of discussion in a paper 
reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the Charter for the following 
reason: if I were ever provided with the opportunity to redesign the 
Constitution from the ground up, or to create a similar document in 
another jurisdiction, I would have real hesitation about enacting a clause 
drafted along the lines of section 11(f). 
My difficulty with section 11(f) is less principled than it is practical, 
and relates to the burden this clause imposes through its imposing nature 
as a constitutional requirement. Although section 11(f) might not seem 
out of place when one considers the long-standing Canadian attachment 
to jury trials,79 its form and use of particular terminology make it an unusual 
Charter clause. Unlike the other sections of the Charter enumerated 
under the heading of “Legal Rights”, most of which tend to focus upon 
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principles like the right to “reasonable” bail and the need for a trial 
within a “reasonable” time, section 11(f) is phrased in an extremely precise 
manner.80 Unlike section 11(g)-(i), which impose limited restrictions of 
a principled nature upon the government’s ability to retroactively impose 
liability or try a person twice, section 11(f) dictates a specific mode of 
decision-making and mandates the availability of this forum for a wide 
range of offences. As a constitutional document that constitutes the 
“supreme law of Canada”,81 this particular form of procedure is effectively 
immutable and leaves little room for future debate on the role of the jury 
in Canada. 
Adopting a right of this kind has a number of drawbacks. As the 
Supreme Court has repeated on a number of occasions, the constitution 
is a “living tree” that needs to breathe and adapt to changing times as 
well as the evolving needs of the populace.82 This flexibility is important 
because the view of what composes an essential part of the criminal 
process tends to change over time. Over the past few years we  
have witnessed a number of occasions where the Supreme Court has 
reconsidered its earlier Charter views and altered long-standing precedent 
in light of experience and changing circumstances. As Professor 
Stribopoulous has written, this is a positive development, as “the long-
term viability of any common law constitutional system very much depends 
on the authority and willingness of its final court of appeal to revisit 
established doctrine when experience has demonstrated that one of its 
earlier judgments is either being misconstrued or was wrongly decided.”83 
Still, change of this sort can only happen when the Charter provides 
enough flexibility for it to occur. 
Unlike just about every other Charter right, however, section 11(f) 
is incapable of adapting. Regardless of what we might learn about the 
effectiveness of the jury process and how we may one day wish to 
reassess our mechanisms of deciding criminal trials over the coming 
decades and centuries, the truth is that we remain tied to a system of 
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trial by jury for eternity. To a certain extent, the Charter even prohibits 
meaningful debate about the value of this institution. Over time, we may 
change our stance about various rules of evidence, what we consider a 
crime, and the appropriate way to sentence, but the permissible range of 
trial options will remain untouched. Leaving aside the unlikely possibilities 
of amending the Charter or using the notwithstanding clause, we are 
forever locked into the jury process as the primary option for resolving 
serious criminal trials. 
This might be appropriate if jury trials were universally accepted 
and unassailable, but this is hardly the case. Although trial by jury is 
historically familiar and has many supporters, the institution has come 
under attack for a variety of reasons too numerous to list fully here.84 
Briefly, however, there are concerns about the effectiveness of juries as 
decision-makers,85 the manner in which juries extend trial length and 
heighten the prospect of successful appeals owing to the need for a jury 
charge, and even how the cost of the process diminishes the overall pool 
of money available to criminal justice objectives.86 Trials in remote 
communities, especially those in the North, also pose huge problems for 
the right to trial by jury.87 Often the community is too small to put 
together a functional jury at all, as most residents are related in some 
way to either the victim or the accused, or both.88 
It is somewhat ironic that the “permanent” enshrinement of the right 
to a jury trial in Canada occurred at about the very moment that serious 
research into the deliberative process of jurors first began taking place 
internationally. Generally speaking, Canada has lagged behind in this 
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investigative trend, but a number of American researchers have spent 
the last two decades examining how well jurors are actually able to perform 
their primary task, and the output being generated is raising questions 
about the value of the jury system.89 For the first time in history, people 
are actually considering what exactly jurors do within the secret confines 
of the jury room, and asking pertinent questions about their effectiveness 
as decision-makers. 
But what will Canadians do with this information? Because of section 
11(f), we will find it immensely difficult to have any sort of productive 
conversation about trial alternatives,90 as any such discussion will begin 
from the premise that the jury system is unassailable. This conclusion 
may strike many as the correct manner of proceeding, both today and 
for all time,91 but personally, I remain unconvinced about the wisdom of 
beginning a discussion of this sort from an imperative position, and 
would at least like to have the ability to examine all procedural options 
unconstrained by an irrevocable constitutional requirement.92 Down the 
road, the choice to stick with juries indefinitely may prove a significant 
impediment to large-scale improvement of the criminal justice system. 
As Marcus Gleisser wrote in the preface to Juries and Justice,93 a book 
that questioned the status of the jury in America: 
It is time for a good hard look at what has long been the sacred cow of 
justice and regarded by many as fundamental in a democracy — the 
American system of trial by jury. Too many persons regard it as an 
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inviolate institution, a sovereign never to be questioned, something not 
to be disturbed. 
Unfortunately for those who take such views, democratic systems invite 
challenge and thrive on questions. Invasion of the darkest corner is 
welcomed. Long-standing idols may be examined to see if they deserve 
continued respect or if they have been left behind by changing times.94 
This comment is equally relevant to Canada. We shall see over the coming 
decades and centuries whether section 11(f) remains the beginning and 
end of any discussion about the jury process. 
IV. PROPOSED SUBSECTION 11(j) — A NEW RIGHT TO A  
TRIAL FREE OF UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE 
Over the past 25 years, the Charter’s influence on criminal justice 
issues has been so dramatic that it becomes easy to conclude that no 
area of law has been immune. That impression is inaccurate, however. 
With the obvious exception of the impact caused by section 24(2), the law 
of evidence has remained generally free from Charter scrutiny. Leaving 
aside sections 11(c) and 13, which address very particular issues relating 
to the privilege against self-incrimination, none of the Charter rights 
specifically target evidentiary concerns, and the absence of such a provision 
has prevented the Charter from having a major effect in this area. 
Despite a lack of Charter interference the law of evidence has 
undergone its own radical transformation over the past 25 years. Around 
1982, a series of significant Supreme Court decisions began making 
major alterations to Canada’s evidentiary framework,95 and two trends 
bear particular mention. First was the principled revolution,96 the 
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judicial movement away from prescribed rules and exceptions towards 
admissibility premised on the discretionary measurement of particular 
circumstances and applicable principles in individual cases.97 The second 
tendency involved a strengthening faith in jurors, and the decision to 
eschew exclusion in marginal cases in favour of admitting potentially 
prejudicial evidence with a strong warning to the jury.98 
For the most part, both changes have been positive ones. The move 
to a principled approach swept away outmoded concepts of proof  
that had become “preposterously rigid”99 and simultaneously forced a 
reconsideration of the governing tenets of admissibility. The courts 
revisited the established rules in almost every area of evidence law, and 
recognized that many were obstructing the search for truth — often for 
spurious reasons — and keeping the jury from achieving its primary 
task. During this period, the law governing experts, hearsay, character 
evidence, prior criminal history, corroboration and many more were all 
substantially revised, with the common thrust being a greater reliance on 
the application of discretion at the expense of fixed rules, and more 
evidence being provided to the jury for consideration. 
Nonetheless, in spite of the flexibility spurred by these reforms, neither 
trend has been impervious to criticism,100 with perhaps the most significant 
charge claiming that both developments ignore a number of larger systemic 
issues in the law of evidence. The principled approach gives judges a 
fair amount of discretion and asks them to make decisions based on the 
needs of individual cases. In theory, this allows judges to weigh all the 
competing factors tending towards admission or exclusion and come to 
a balanced decision grounded in principle. In the real world of busy trial 
courts, however, judges are often forced to make decisions quickly on 
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the fly. In this environment, there is a risk that discretionary application 
permits judges and lawyers to ignore important systemic factors that 
should play a role in the decision-making process.101 
The shift towards providing more evidence to juries raises similar 
issues. Once again, the trend has been towards greater admissibility, 
especially where the concern is with probative evidence that a jury might 
use improperly. Judges now tasked with making decisions on admission 
are told to lean in favour of letting juries have the evidence, with a warning 
not to draw a prejudicial inference. As Dickson J. stated in Corbett:102 
 There is perhaps a risk that if told of the fact that the accused has 
a criminal record, the jury will make more than it should of that fact. 
But concealing the prior criminal record of an accused who testifies 
deprives the jury of information relevant to credibility, and creates a 
serious risk that the jury will be presented with a misleading picture. 
 In my view, the best way to balance and alleviate these risks is to 
give the jury all the information, but at the same time give a clear 
direction as to the limited use they are to make of such information. 
Rules which put blinders over the eyes of the trier of fact should be 
avoided except as a last resort. It is preferable to trust the good sense 
of the jury and to give the jury all relevant information, so long as it is 
accompanied by a clear instruction in law from the trial judge regarding 
the extent of its probative value.103 
These two trends have clearly had a transforming impact on the law 
of evidence, but their development has occurred at exactly the same time 
as another powerful trend came to the attention of the Canadian public: 
the tragic reality of wrongful convictions. For better and worse, Canada 
has been one of the world’s leaders in investigating this area, as it is home 
to a number of high-profile cases that have gone awry, and also the site 
of detailed and fruitful inquiries into what went wrong.104 The result has 
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been a rich and developing scholarship surrounding the sources of wrongful 
convictions.105 
Not surprisingly, there is no set or predictable framework outlining the 
causes of every wrongful conviction, but there is little doubt that the law 
of evidence has been an important contributor. Careful study has revealed 
that some species of proof have disturbing correlations to miscarriages 
of justice. Jailhouse informants, identification evidence and certain types 
of expert opinion — to name just a few — have all been identified as 
causes.106 
As the scholarship in this area continues to progress, there is growing 
reason to believe that the principled revolution and the trend towards 
granting juries access to potentially prejudicial evidence have been 
unwilling partners in heightening the risk of wrongful convictions. The 
move to discretionary admissibility asks judges to make decisions on 
evidence by focusing on the risk factors present in an individual case. 
What we have learned from the study of wrongful convictions, however, 
is how difficult it can be to spot the trends that create a risk of a 
miscarriage of justice by looking at isolated fact patterns.107 
The decision to put more evidence in the hands of the jurors and 
trust them to use it properly raises similar concerns. The current test of 
principled admissibility only permits judges to exclude evidence when 
its prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value. But the admissibility 
test measures these values purely by assessing the hypothetical impact 
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of the evidence, and does not consider its potential reliability.108 All 
questions of credibility are left to the jury, even when the nature of the 
evidence or the reliability of the witness is subject to known systemic 
flaws.109 In determining admissibility, judges generally do not consider 
whether the evidence being given to the jury is of a type that has been 
shown to be unreliable in the past. The evidence suggests that jurors 
lacking professional experience in fact-finding are not always able to 
draw these sorts of nuanced conclusions in rendering verdicts.110 More 
and more, one has a sneaking suspicion that our treatment of evidence is 
playing an important role in causing wrongful convictions.111 
Until now, the Charter has played a very limited role in this debate, 
as the courts have rejected the suggestion that section 7 or section 11(d) 
encompasses a protection against unreliable evidence that might taint the 
jury.112 This needs to be remedied. A specific Charter protection against 
evidence with the potential to cause a miscarriage of justice would force 
judges to recognize that charges to the jury and discretionary decisions 
on admission are no solution in preventing wrongful convictions.113 
Occasionally, evidence must be excluded to ensure a fair trial, and it is 
necessary to use the emerging research detailing the common causes of 
wrongful convictions in the search for a more principled admissibility 
framework. 
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The proposed subsection 11(j) would read as follows: 
 11. Any person charged with an offence has the right … (j) not to 
be confronted with evidence where that evidence is unreliable or causes 
a prejudicial effect that outweighs the evidence’s probative value, 
especially where the type of evidence in question has the demonstrated 
potential of causing a miscarriage of justice. 
The proposed subsection would accomplish two important goals. 
First, it would give courts a power they do not currently possess: to 
exclude evidence of an unreliable nature, with the wording of the section 
emphasizing a difference between evidence that is unreliable, and evidence 
with the potential to prejudice the accused. Such a clause would provoke 
courts to impose stricter measures of admissibility where the evidence in 
question is of a type that demonstrably raises the risk of wrongful 
convictions. Moreover, it would effectively reverse existing jurisprudence 
precluding judges from drawing conclusions on admissibility relating to 
the reliability of evidence. 
The second objective served by the provision is the specific 
enshrinement of the principle that evidence should not be admitted 
where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. On its own, 
this might not sound particularly ambitious, since this principle is well 
established at common law, but the proposed subsection 11(j) would 
compel judges to reconsider their current manner of exercising the 
discretion to admit evidence in cases where the nature of the evidence 
has the established potential of causing miscarriages of justice. Hopefully, 
this clause would encourage the judiciary to reconsider the existing 
approach to discretion so as to apply clearer standards of admissibility 
and recognize systemic factors that go beyond the strict confines of the 
case before them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982114 was a watershed 
moment in Canadian history, one that through the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms115 changed the criminal justice system forever. For 
the most part, this has been a positive modification, but the decision to 
create an immutable Constitution comes with certain costs as well. The 
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enduring character of a constitutional document enshrines its standards 
permanently through the country’s judicial framework, and while this is 
generally regarded as beneficial, in that it robs the ability of legislatures 
to tinker with what are seen as accepted norms, permanence of this kind 
can be problematic, especially where the choice to enact or the wording 
of a particular constitutional clause turns out to be less than ideal. 
Twenty-five years after its enactment, we can now see that the 
Charter’s drafting has generally held up well, though certain aspects have 
proven troublesome. In some cases, the wording of the clauses has led to 
difficulties, while in other instances, it is the courts themselves, through 
interpretation of these clauses, that have created the obstacles. Over time, 
of course, many of these kinks should be ironed out of the process. 
While it may seem long to lawyers striving to remember the pre-Charter 
era, it is important to remember that 25 years remains a short time period 
to assess the overall value of a constitutional document. As much as a 
revision of some aspects of the Charter’s wording might be desirable as 
a theoretical matter, the varied interests that would inevitably use such 
an occasion to attack protections that currently exist render such a “cure” 
much less palatable than the “disease”, especially in an era that seems to 
place so much prominence on matters of collective security at the expense 
of individual rights. For that reason, as much as it would be useful to 
rectify problematic aspects of our constitutional equation, I am thankful 
that rewriting the Charter is likely to be an exercise that remains tied to 
the realm of the imagination, at least in the Canadian context. 
Still, that does not render the exercise valueless. Reconceptualizing 
Charter guarantees and the remedies that enforce them is a necessary part 
of any constitutional dialogue. Examining alternative ways of drafting 
particular clauses may alert us to the real meaning of the existing rights, 
and force judges to reconsider whether current interpretations accord 
with the real purpose of a specific guarantee. Additionally, the Charter’s 
usefulness is not confined to Canada, as the Constitution also provides  
a valuable framework for rights documents in other jurisdictions. 116 
Considering our experience with the Charter may prove useful in helping 
these countries decide whether to adopt the Canadian wording in its entirety 
or with some modifications. In both instances, using the imagination to 
consider how the Charter might look if we started the process afresh is 
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one good way of thinking about what has worked, what has not, what rights 
are still required and where we might wish to have greater flexibility in 
future. 
